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On a cool morning in March 2012, in the shadow of three New York City
government landmarks—the Municipal Building, City Hall, and the Tweed
Courthouse—New York Law School Law Review’s then-Faculty Publisher Marcey
Grigsby and I met over coffee to talk about transitions.
	The first transition we discussed was the one I was about to make from City
Hall, where I had served as legal counsel to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg for more
than ten years, to New York Law School, where I now serve as Dean and President.
The second transition we discussed is the one that will take place on January 1, 2014
when many of the city's local elected officeholders, including the Mayor, Comptroller,
and Public Advocate, will leave office and be replaced by new leaders elected in the
November 2013 general election.
With Professor Ross Sandler, Director of New York Law School’s Center for
New York City Law, we agreed that the citywide transition and the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the 1988 and 1989 Charter revisions, together presented a unique
opportunity to ref lect on the impact of charter revision over a quarter-century.
Indeed, the fundamental structural changes that were first considered by the 1986–
88 Commission, and ultimately proposed by the 1989 Commission and adopted by
the voters, are the ones by which the city is governed today. Although a significant
earlier work documenting the process and intent behind the 1989 revisions was
written by Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. and Eric Lane, and published by this Law
Review, there has been relatively little serious reflection since then on how well those
changes have served the needs of the city over the years.1
Similarly, there has been relatively little discussion about the changes brought
about as a result of the work of the Charter Revision Commissions post–1989.
Accordingly, the development of a clearer understanding of the long-term impacts of
all of those changes, and what we learned from the debates during this period,
became a key objective of our inquiry. To help in this discussion, we were able to
gather together some of the most influential figures in city government and certain
key players in Charter revision. These participants included former Commission
Chairs, as well as Commissioners and staff, other public officials, scholars, leaders
from the “good government” community, and observers from the media. 2
1.

See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New
York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 723 (1998).

2.

See Lucas Anderson, Promoting an Effective and Responsive City Government by Retaining and Strengthening
the Office of the Public Advocate, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 165 (2013–2014); John Avlon, Change the Rules
and You Change the Game: That’s Why Charter Revisions Matter in New York City, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
25 (2013–2014); Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
85 (2013–2014); Elizabeth Fine & James Caras, Twenty-Five Years of the Council-Mayor Governance of
New York City: A History of the Council’s Powers, the Separation of Powers, and Issues for Future Resolution,
58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119 (2013–2014); Matthew Goldstein, Working Toward a Better-Functioning
Government: Reflections on the 2010 Charter Revision Commission, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 43 (2013–
2014); Randy M. Mastro, On the Voters’ Terms: Amending New York City’s Charter to Protect Voter-Imposed
Term Limits, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 139 (2013–2014); Christine Quinn, A Discussion on New York City
and its Future: A Conversation with New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 55 (2013–2014); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Twenty-Five Years Later: Reflections of New York City’s
1989 Charter Revision Commission and on Charter Commissions in General, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 95
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An understanding of the evolution and efficacy of New York City’s basic
governing document—in essence its constitution—matters greatly. Like a
constitution, the Charter broadly sets out the structure, powers, functions, duties,
and processes of the government. However, unlike a constitution, the Charter
generally does not create substantive rights. And, unlike the complex processes
required to amend the U.S. or New York State Constitutions, most provisions of the
Charter can be changed locally by simple legislation, passed by the City Council and
signed into law by the Mayor. However, there are areas of local lawmaking that are
the subject of mandatory referendum and they include proposals that would, for
example, abolish, transfer, or curtail any power of an elected officer, or eliminate or
create new elective offices altogether.3 A referendum is also mandated for proposals
that would, for instance, affect the city’s franchises, dispense with public notice and
hearing requirements, or repeal or amend the core provisions of the city’s conflictsof-interest law.4 Because Charter Revision Commissions have the power to place
proposals on the ballot, they have been appointed to review and make recommendations
on these issues and others.
	New York State’s Municipal Home Rule Law provides for the creation of Charter
Revision Commissions through a variety of means, including through the action of
the Council, the voters, and the Mayor.5 Commissions are legally mandated to
review the entire Charter and any proposals subject to referendum must be approved
by a majority of voters to be enacted into law.6 Over the past twenty-five years, the
process of Charter revision by referendum has been facilitated by nine mayorally
appointed Charter Revision Commissions. The 1986–88 and 1989 Commissions
were appointed by Mayor Koch; the 1998, 1999, and 2001 Commissions were
appointed by Mayor Giuliani; and the 2002, 2003, 2004–05, and 2010 Commissions
were appointed by Mayor Bloomberg. All proposals to change the Charter as set
forth by these Commissions, except those in 1999 and 2003, were adopted by the
voters.
Indeed, the outcomes of Charter revisions can profoundly affect the distribution
of political power, accountability, and wealth in the city. Outcomes of past Charter
revisions have had practical and lasting impacts upon the city’s leadership structure
and functions, how its elections are undertaken, how its communities are defined,
empowered, and served, how its budget and finances are administered, and how its
public integrity is safeguarded. These governmental functions are all critical
components to ensuring a well-functioning democracy, maintaining public
confidence, facilitating civic engagement, and fostering an environment for continued
(2013–2014); Edward Skyler, Can Government Work?, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 29 (2013–2014); David S.
Yassky, Learning from Washington: A New Approach to Analyzing the Structure of New York City’s
Government, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 71 (2013–2014).
3.

N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 23(2) (McKinney 2013); N.Y.C. Charter § 38(4), (5) (2013).

4.

N.Y.C. Charter § 38(7), (12), (18).

5.

N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law §§ 36(2), (3), (4).

6.

Id. § 36(5).
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investment in the city by business and industry. It is, therefore, understandable how
efforts to change the Charter over the years have captured the widespread attention
of citizens, community leaders, politicians, and advocacy groups alike.
While all of these Commissions generated controversy to varying degrees, none
of them carried the legal imperative to reshape the city’s governing structure like the
1989 Commission. That legal imperative resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Board of Estimate v. Morris,7 which held that the structure of the city’s
longstanding governing body, the Board of Estimate, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not comply with the principle of oneperson, one-vote. Although the 1986–88 Commission set the stage by reviewing
proposals to restructure the government while Morris was pending in the lower
courts, those proposals were ultimately deferred for consideration. Instead, that
Commission placed on the ballot proposals aimed at opening up citizen access and
participation in government. Accordingly, after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Morris, it was the 1989 Commission that ultimately put forth proposals to redress
structural problems. When approved by the voters, those proposals yielded, among
other things, the abolition of the Board of Estimate and the devolution of its powers
to a variety of elective offices—some of which were reshaped, eliminated, or created
anew. The resulting structure is what governs the city today.
Because the 1989 Commission was appointed out of necessity, and with such a
weighty charge, it effectively set the standard against which the processes, and often
the substantive merits, of subsequent Charter Revision Commissions have been
judged. It is understood that subsequent Commissions, while legally mandated to
review the entire Charter, were not appointed to address any legal imperative per se,
but instead were appointed to consider proposals relating to the important political
and institutional dynamics or operational challenges of the day.
As we planned the symposium, we hoped that Mayor Koch, who appointed the
1986–88 and 1989 Commissions, and Dr. Frank Macchiarola,8 who chaired the 2003
Commission and served on the 1986–88 Commission, would be able to participate
and offer their wise perspectives on Charter revision. Sadly, that was not to be, as
both Mayor Koch and Dr. Macchiarola passed away before the symposium.
By way of background, I came to know both Mayor Koch and Frank Macchiarola
through my work in city government, and on various Charter Revision Commissions.
I served as chief counsel to the 2003 Commission and that was where Frank and I
became friends. I visited with him on December 14, 2012, four days before he passed
away, and told him that the symposium would honor the legacy of his civic life. He
was thrilled, warm, engaged, and insightful as always. He was full of pride and hope
for the city and its people even at the end of his most extraordinary journey.

7.

489 U.S. 688 (1989).

8.

Frank Macchiarola’s career in public service spanned more than five decades; among other posts, Dr.
Macchiarola served as Chancellor of the New York City Public Schools, Dean of the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, and President and later Chancellor of St. Francis College.
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A month later, on January 13, 2013, I shared Sunday dinner with Mayor Koch.
Among a host of topics, we talked about the symposium. I had hoped he would join
us and say a few words about our friend Frank. I also hoped he would offer his
thoughts on the long-term impact of the 1986–88 and 1989 Commissions. On the
question of their impact, he answered in his inimitable way: “A good question!”
Because of the gravity of the changes contemplated by the 1989 Commission, and
because Mayor Koch did not articulate a preconceived idea about what should happen
with the 1989 Commission, he allowed it to develop proposals without a prescribed
outcome to ensure broad input and support. At an especially tumultuous time for the
city, this was viewed as both rare and even statesmanlike, and the proposal that
emerged was successful in garnering enough votes to be adopted. Sadly, Mayor Koch
passed away on February 1, 2013, just before the symposium.
Ed Koch and Frank Macchiarola were both wonderful people and leaders, and
they were pioneers and visionaries who understood accountability and urgency. In
many ways, Frank was very “Kochian.” And like Mayor Koch, he didn’t take any
guff. He was very passionate in the views he held, but was equally interested in
hearing other perspectives.
Frank engaged people and inspired them. He challenged them when it was
needed. And, he was always right. Like Koch, Frank was one of those real New
Yorkers who knew how to stand up for his beliefs. When he saw an injustice or
something that needed to be fixed, he set out to do something about it. But, Frank
was as practical as he was political. After all, he was intimately familiar with
Brooklyn’s political wars and knew how both clubhouse politics and a party system
could work against a broader democracy. His dogged beliefs are what allowed him to
serve on the 1986–88 Commission, which proposed to New York City the nonpartisan
election system that is now in place for special elections.
	Those same beliefs in how government should work for its citizenry are what led
Frank to serve as a founding member of the City’s Campaign Finance Board, a
position to which Koch appointed him. It also drove him to break new ground while
leading the City’s 1993 Districting Commission. All of these reform efforts embodied
bold moves to open up opportunity for those who otherwise might not have had a
chance to seek office.
Frank was particularly pleased when Mayor Bloomberg appointed him to Chair
the 2003 Charter Revision Commission. Unlike the 1989 Commission, the 2003
Commission was formed with a specific charge—to review the concept and viability
of implementing a system of nonpartisan primary elections in the city. I think for
Frank this was a golden opportunity to take on an aspect of election reform that
represented “unfinished business” from the 1986–88 Commission. Given that
Charter Revision Commissions are as much about process as they are about anything
else, we got off to quite a start. As a veteran of several Charter Revision Commissions,
I understood the “flow” of the process—there is a beginning, a middle, and an end—
so, imagine the reaction when, in March 2003, Frank declared “[t]here will be a
ballot question when the charter commission concludes its work on the question of
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non-partisan elections . . . . It is not a question of whether, it is a question of how.
That issue will be put forward.” 9
Putting the issue of nonpartisan elections before the voters posed a great challenge
for the next seven months, but Frank was an indomitable advocate, taking to task
every naysayer. He demanded that they overcome their preconceived notions and
personal investments in favor of what he held to be the certain improvements
resulting from nonpartisan elections. At the final meeting of the Commission, Frank
said, “[t]onight we cast our votes for the people who are today voiceless and left out
as a result of a political system that has become a vehicle of the elites who use it for
personal interest and private ambitions. As we go forward tonight, let us reaffirm our
faith in the democracy we practice and have brought to life as result of our work and
time on this Commission. Tonight we cast our votes for the generations that are to
come after us.”10
Although the democratic process did not yield the proposal’s passage at the polls,
I don’t think Frank was daunted by the outcome—a true believer in incremental
progress, and employing different tactics as the times may demand, Frank viewed
what others termed “defeat” as a victory in opening up one of several critical
discussions that still are ongoing today.
On the pages that follow, you will discover the powerful voices that our
contributors have shared to shape Charter revision in New York City: past, present
and future. Indeed, these voices all agree that Charter Revision Commissions have a
powerful role in engaging the citizenry and embracing change, a role that should be
exercised cautiously, judiciously, and with purpose.
I extend both my personal and institutional thanks to all who have contributed to
this valuable collection of observations, lessons, and insightful analyses.

9.

See Michael Cooper, For City Charter Commission, First a Goal, Then the Members, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27,
2003, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/nyregion/for-city-charter-commissionfirst-a-goal-then-the-members.html?ref=frankjmacchiarola.

10.

Press Release, N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Statement from Frank J. Macchiarola, Chairman,
Charter Revision Comm’n (Aug. 25, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/html/
archives/pr_030826.shtml.
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